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throughout history: their initiative and their quick adaptability. To be constantly on the move, camping in strange places, was to force oneself to adapt constantly-and fast. Pastoral nomads had to adapt their culture to regular and seasonal changes of environment in times of peace and to abrupt and radical changes of environment in times of war. A kind of "natural selection" accustomed the nomads to revel in a feeling of freedom. They liked to move and were able to do so.
Migration meant leadership, constant readiness to meet unforeseeable dangers, and being ever ready to fight. Leaders were accustomed to keeping their people and their herds in motion along their regular migration routes, a talent that helped them keep armies and herds of captives in motion too. Migration promoted martial qualities, the equestrian archer, the coordinated hunt in times of peace, the tactical army in times of war. When the men were on campaign, they could leave the herding to their women and children: pastoralism was not labor-intensive. The nomads were not obliged to defend any fields of crops or fixed dwellings, and they could, if they chose, easily sustain war in their own territory. In the steppe environment, war was not so destructive as it was in the sedentary world.
When it came to fighting, everybody was involved. The distinction between soldier and herdsman did not exist. War and raiding-and the "vengeance" (os) that justified them-were the glory of the tribe and of the nation. The Mongolian culture of the thirteenth century was a warriorist culture that esteemed heroes most.
Ecologically, no social organization was needed above the level of the tribe. Any would-be supratribal ruler had to bring to heel a highly mobile population, who could simply decamp and ignore his claims to authority. Tribal chiefs were not eager to forfeit their autonomy so that a confederal potentate might rule and tax their tribes. Unlike agrarian societies, which could amass wealth and store it, steppe society rested on animal wealth, which had to be pastured extensively and could not be concentrated in a governmental center of power. Nor, for the same reason, could a supratribal ruler maintain a standing army at his beck and call.
SOCIETY
The tribes' obedience could not be held indefinitely by force. It had to be bought. To buy the obedience of the tribes, he who would be ruler must give them something that they could not obtain by themselves. Self-defense was not enough to induce them to enter into a durable supratribal polity. Temporary alliances would suffice for that, and often the best defense was simply to disperse.
Wealth was another matter. But here too, to rob wealth from other nomads a supratribal polity was not essential. Nomadic wealth was pastoral wealth, and it might be necessary to seize the animals of a neighboring tribe if one's own capital of livestock dropped below the minimum number (about twenty to forty animals for each unit family), but plundering other nomads was not a durable means for enriching the membership of a tribe. Raiding meant reprisals, and in any case the spoils could not be stored. Stolen animals had to be distributed for pasturing, and if the tribe was already rich, they added to its pastoral obligations without providing any diversification of resources.
To extort wealth from an agrarian society, however, steppe nomads needed a supratribal polity. True, a tribe might raid a farming village or a town, obtaining animals in times of need or, in times of plenty, obtaining wealth of a kind that the steppe economy did not produce. But villages and towns were usually defended by a government, so that raiding, in the normal course of events, could be only an occasional expedient.
Long-term extortion of agrarian wealth was beyond the powers of a single tribe, but even here the ability to carry on peaceful trade, exchanging pastoral surpluses for agrarian produce and urban products, muted the tribes' willingness to give up any of their autonomy for the sake of supratribal entanglements. It was in the case of China, where the steppe-sown dichotomy was sharper than anywhere else in the Eurasian steppe, and where the agrarian government usually monopolized or greatly restricted external trade, that the tribes' desire to extort was strongest.
Three alternative policies were available to the steppe nomads for the continuing acquisition of China's agrarian wealth: invasion, threat of invasion, and outright dependence. A fourth policy, com-monly practiced by the desert nomads of Central Asia and the Middle East, namely conquest and dominion, was impractical for the nomads of the steppe because of the geographical separation of the steppe from the world of ther sown. In fact, it was not until the Mongols themselves conquered and ruled China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that a fully nomadic steppe-based empireas opposed to kingdoms of what the anthropologist T. J. Barfield has referred to as "Manchurian" dynasties-first implemented a conquest and dominion policy in East Asia. 2 For outright dependence on the Chinese state, no supratribal polity was required, although it was helpful in securing better terms from the Chinese government, but for invasions or the ability to pose a credible threat of invasion, tribal coordination was essential.
The logic of the foregoing analysis is that the main purpose of the tribe was to exploit the pastoral habitat and that the main purpose of the supratribal polity was to extort wealth from agrarian societies.
THE TRIBE
The tribe was the basic unit of society. It had its own traditions, institutions, customs, beliefs, and myths of common ancestry. These, if the tribe was of mixed linguistic or ethnological origin, promoted unity and the idea of a shared identity. All members of the tribe, including the common people (haran), were, by tradition, considered descendants of a single ancestor. Especially close was the fictive kinship ascribed to the leading families, who were usually regarded as nobles. The leading or noble families bore surnames that purported to designate clans (obogh) and subclans (yasun) in the tribal kinship system (whether commoners also belonged to obogh 2 Much of the thinking that underlies the present paper has been profoundly influenced by half a decade of conversations with T. J. Barfield, who developed the concept of "Manchurian" conquest states and is preparing a book-length study of the "Manchurian" factor in the relationship between steppe and sown in East Asia. He has talked me out of various errors-one being the idea that the cohesion of steppe tribal confederations (as opposed to steppe "empires," a distinction that I shall develop in the course of the present essay) required war. In this connection, see his "Hsiung-nu Imperial Confederacy: Organization and Foreign Policy," JAS 40.1 (Nov. 1981): 45-61. The works of Radloff, Barthold, Vladimirtsov, and Owen Lattimore are essential background. Discussions with F. W. Cleaves, 0. Pritsak, and Chin-fu Hung have also taught me a great deal, but none of these can be blamed for the inadequacies of this essay. and yasun is unknown), and dominant among these was the chiefly lineage, from whom the tribal chief (noyan and, I suspect, beki as well as other titles) was customarily chosen.
Choice of the tribal chief was, in a manner of speaking, electoral, being governed by the principle of tanistry,3 a central element in the dynamics of Turkish, Mongolian, and Manchurian politics that historians of Asia have too often overlooked. Put briefly, the principle of tanistry held that the tribe should be led by the best qualified member of the chiefly house. At the chief's death, in other words, the succession did not pass automatically, in accordance with any principle of seniority such as primogeniture, but rather was supposed to go to the most competent of the eligible heirs. By custom, a father's personal property passed, at his death, by "ultimogeniture" to his youngest son by his principal wife. Chieftaincy did not.
The existence of two mutually contradictory traditions of succession-patrilineal and lateral-constantly reinforced this element of choice. By patrilineal tradition, the succession was expected to pass from father to son. By lateral tradition, the chieftaincy was expected to pass to the chiefly house's senior male. By the lateral tradition, in other words, at a chief's demise, the succession was to pass to his next eldest brother and so on down to the youngest brother before passing on to the next generation, namely the eldest chief's sons. Needless to say, such a contradictory system could justify any choice that the leading members of the tribe might make.
Unless the tribe was very large, most tribal interests were usually best served by a timely resolution of the succession question, and the tribal leaders must ordinarily have managed to keep disruptions to a minimum. But in a large tribe, rival candidates for the chieftaincy, each closely backed by his own retinue of personal supporters (ndkor), might occasionally split the tribe, either temporarily or permanently. In a succession struggle, the rival candidates and 3 I take liberties with a Celtic institution, following a suggestion of Jeanette Mirsky, who "gave" it to me during a chat at Princeton in 1972. Some useful reading is suggested in Jack Goody, ed., Succession to High Office (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), editor's introduction, p. 54, n. 15. My development of the concept is to be found in "TurcoMongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire, " in Eucharisterion: Essays Presented to Omeljan Pritsak, ed. Ihor Sevcenko and Frank E. Sysyn, Harvard Ukranian Studies 3-4 (1979-80), Part 1, pp. 236-51. their nokor competed for the support of the tribe's leading men and formed factions that could either compromise or fight. Nor were the rivals limited to the backing of members of their own tribe. If a tribe were part of a confederation, a given candidate might win the backing of the confederal ruler or other powerful elements within the confederation. Tribes or leading tribal families also commonly had special relationships with tribal (or even non-tribal) elements outside the confederation and sometimes even beyond the edges of the steppe. These too could be called upon for support or for asylum in the event that a given candidate met defeat.4
Not just members of the chiefly lineage but also leaders of the tribe's noble clans not infrequently surrounded themselves with nokor and held a potential for usurping the chieftaincy or breaking away, taking their haran with them, and forming a new tribe. Commoners themselves, however, followed the leaders of one or another of the noble clans and rarely formed secessionist factions on their own initiative.
Another important figure in tribal politics was the shaman (bdge). The nomads' need to know the unknowable under quickly changing conditions and their need to deal with the whims of fortune and the forces of nature lent power to the shaman's role. The shaman commonly belonged to a kind of shamanic "guild," which provided links with other tribes that could benefit the chief and the tribal membership-links that bolstered the shaman's influence within the tribe. Being in touch with the supernatural world, the shaman's support for a given candidate for the chieftaincy might carry weight if the shaman decided to involve himself in the succession choice. Shamans chose auspicious days for battle, healed the physically sick and the emotionally disturbed, enabled childless women to conceive, warded off evil, and the like. Their roles probably ranged from that of nokor of the tribal chief to one of rivalling him for authority. Sometimes the shaman might himself become the tribal chief, combining both roles in one person.
Once the succession had been established, the chief's main responsibilities were to provide leadership, assign pasture, and determine the routes of migration. His authority was both counterbalanced and confirmed by the tribe's other leading men, who may be regarded as a tribal council, and also by the shaman. The tribe's organizational structure would seem to have been a compromise between, on the one hand, the authority of the chiefly and noble clans, each of which retained control over its own commoners, and, on the other, the requirements of grazing and migration. In most tribes of any size there were probably at least two administrative levels of tribal subdivisions between the level of the tribal chief and that of the individual tenthold.
THE SUPRATRIBAL
POLITY:
NATION, CONFEDERATION, EMPIRE
To some degree the supratribal polity was a macrocosm of the tribe. Its traditions and institutions, its beliefs, practices, and myths of common origin were derived for the most part from tribal prototypes. Like the tribe, the supratribal polity found reinforcement in political alliances, matrimonial ties, and traditional rivalries and enmities both inside and outside itself. Like the tribe, it promoted the idea of a common ethnicity and social identity.
It had a royal lineage (the Mongols called theirs altan urugh-"golden lineage"), from whom the supratribal ruler was expected to be chosen by tanistry, and the choice would be justified by one of the two opposing traditions of succession, patrilineal or lateral. A ruling tribe (the Mongghol tribe, for example) dominated the polity and gave it its name. The ruler's clan (Borjigid, in the case of Chinggis Khan), to which the royal lineage belonged, headed the fictively related clans that composed the tribe. The other component tribes, each headed by a chiefly lineage, were referred to-by the Mongols, at least-as "submitted" (ii), whereas tribes outside the polity were spoken of as "unsubmitted" (bulgha). Outside groups and nontribal population could be incorporated into the polity in one of at least three main ways: as a component tribe under its own indigenous leaders; as "shares" of booty that were distributed among the component tribes; or as non-tribal military forces under the command of the ruler or one of the polity's other leading figures.
Like the tribal chiefs and nobles, the supratribal ruler and all contestants for his office had personal retinues of nokor who served their master as his eyes and ears and hands-as military commanders, administrators, secret or public agents, and specialists of all kinds who formed the nucleus of what could become, if need be, an extended imperial administration. Nokor directed their master's personal guard-cum-household, being, as it were, his slaves and companions. They derived their power and authority exclusively from his person and might be recruited from any social origin, nomadic or sedentary, noble, commoner, or slave. But if they were noblemen, they were not likely to be tribal chiefs (although Chinggis Khan himself, after reaching a certain level of power, deviated from this pattern), inasmuch as the possession of an autonomous basis of power would make for an unreliable nokor.
Like the tribe, the supratribal polity had its shaman, whose role might be anything from the ruler's nokor to his competitor for power.
Among the early Aryan (Indo-Iranian) peoples of the steppe, from whom the Turks and the Mongols ultimately derived much of their culture, the leadership role of the priest had rivalled that of the warrior. Eventually kingship was assigned to the warriors, but the priests, in compensation, were accorded the higher ritual status and were influential in the legitimation of kingship; so they retained the ability to pose ideological challenges to kingly power. A parallel is to be found among the early Arabian tribes, for whom the role of the kahin (shaman or soothsayer) stood, to some degree, in opposition to the authority of the sayyid (tribal chief). The kdhin approved tribal decisions and legitimated the sayyid's authority.
At the supratribal level among the steppe Turks and Mongols, the paramount shaman stood in a similar position to legitimate the ruler or challenge his authority. Even the most powerful supratribal ruler might find himself limited or even threatened by a paramount shaman backed up by the intertribal shamanic "guild."
Given the mobility of nomadic life, the inessential character of supratribal social organization, and the fissiparousness of steppe politics, supratribal polities-being based on segmentary opposition5-were unstable and frequently dissolved altogether. So there could be long periods when the largest effective unit was the tribe. But even in such periods of lapse, traditions of supratribal society persisted, and tribesmen thought of themselves as belonging to "nations" (ulus) that had existed in the past and might at any time be reconstructed under a new or an old name. Ulus, the root meaning of which was "people," could designate a tribe or, more likely, a supratribal "nation," even though such a nation might be nothing more than an idea in people's minds. Ulus could also designate an existing supratribal polity-either a loosely organized "confederation" or a tightly organized "empire." Supratribal society slipped back and forth between supratribal anarchy (a "nation" of purely imaginary existence) and supratribal polity, which in turn fluctuated between loose confederacy and (more rarely) tight autocracy.
Steppe empires came into existence only through the efforts of individual aspirants for the office of supratribal ruler, who, so to speak, conquered the tribes of the supratribal society and then, to keep them united, had no choice but to keep them busy with lucrative wars.
From the rise of the Hsiung-nu at the end of the third century B.C., the East Asian steppe tribal confederations had shown a growing trend toward empire, and the Mongols were its culmination. In the Hsiung-nu confederation, the tribes had forfeited very little of their autonomy-just enough to seem united for the sake of extorting wealth from the Chinese-and in warfare each person had kept whatever plunder he seized. Among the Hsien-pi, who came to the fore in the third century A.D., the ruler had held the right to distribute the booty to the participants. With the rise of the Turks in the sixth century, the ruler's authority had been tighter, with pretensions to absolutism, and his role had been more fully martial. The Khitans, a "Manchurian" empire in Barfield's sense of the term, had carried this trend still farther in the tenth century, introducing a tight military organization and setting a precedent of absolutist centralism that must still have cast its shadow over the Mongolian steppes in the late twelfth century.
THE KHAN
A confederation might be formed on the initiative of the tribes so as to win concessions from China, and, if so, the supratribal ruler might be little more than a nominal sovereign. But the formation of a steppe "empire," in which the supratribal ruler truly ruled, required a steppe "emperor" backed by capable nokor and supported by a powerful coalition of tribal chiefs.
As our present-day experience recedes from the time when individuals as such played the leading parts in history, historians have increasingly tended to downplay the historical roles of individuals, trying to see them and their actions as merely the products of deeper social and economic forces. It is now sometimes difficult even to imagine a historical setting in which society and politics were so structured as to put immense power to initiate into the hands of individual persons, whose personalities and eccentricities thus played a major part in determining the course of history. But in the twelfthcentury Mongolian steppes, the population was small-probably no more than about a million or so people.6 Political structures were fragile, and rule was highly personal.
Being ample, tayang (Chinese t'ai-wang, "great king") were not necessarily employed strictly as titles but commonly rather as the epithets or sobriquets of individual rulers. "Khan" is a convenient generic term for the supratribal ruler, but it should not be thought that the tribes of every steppe "nation" thought of themselves as being necessarily ruled by one.
The steppe khan was surrounded by no pomp, ceremony, or mystery to clothe his kingship in a nimbus of the divine in the way that Iranian, Roman, or Chinese emperors were revealed. His purpose was down-to-earth: to obtain and distribute wealth. Great emphasis was placed on the quality of generosity. (Ogodei, for example, as portrayed in the Persian sources, seems profligate to modern readers, but generosity was essential to popularity-and thus to an empire's cohesion-in the context of pastoral society.) Even more basic was the quality of warrior and leader of men. As the head of a confederation, the ruler might not have to fight, but as autocrat of a steppe empire, the essential qualities were martial ones. An "imperial" khan had to lead his subjects to success on the field of battle and in the extortion of wealth from sedentary governments.
In a steppe empire-as opposed to a confederation-the bond between the khan and the tribal chief was the bond between leader and follower, between general and regimental commander-but between the two men as persons not as offices. So personal was this bond-upon which the integrity of the steppe empire was basedthat at the khan's death, unless his successor recreated the empire on a similar personal basis, the empire soon dissolved.
Being himself the general, the khan of an empire could not delegate his military function to a military specialist. Military and civilian were not divided. The army was society. In his capacity as general, as "imperial" autocrat, the khan's authority was theoretically absolute. This meant that his jurisdiction to the extent to which he could make it do so, extended directly to everybody and was not limited to a contractually defined set of obligations that the khan had a right to demand only of the tribal chiefs.
Autocracy is, of course, an ideal rather than a system-unlike confederacy or bureaucracy or oligarchy. No single person was ever equal to the task of being a thoroughgoing autocrat. Delegation of authority has always been unavoidable, and as autocrats succeeded JOSEPH FLETCHER one another on the thrones of empires, the amount of delegated authority tended to increase so that bureaucrats or oligarchs gradually drained away the autocrat's power. In agrarian empires, dynastic founders most closely approached the autocratic ideal, and their successors distanced themselves from it more and more, unless, as usurpers, they refounded their dynasty and repersonalized the substance of their authority. But in steppe empires the underlying potential for continuing autocracy was greater. If the empire survived from generation to generation at all, it was because each successor tried not to be a successor in the agrarian empires' sense but rather a refounder. Without a refounder, who-ordinarily by struggle-brought his own personal retainers, administrators, and allies with him rather than inheriting those of his predecessor, it was unlikely that the empire would long endure. A steppe empire ruled by an autocrat had good chances for survival, but a steppe empire ruled by an oligarchy-in which the monarch's personal power did not dominate-was in danger of reversion to a confederation or even to a "nation" without a supratribal polity. The inessential nature of the supratribal polity saw to this fragility, as did also the custom of tanistry. Chinggis Khan, Og6dei, and Mongke probably came as close to being true autocrats as any rulers in history.
SUCCESSION
At the tribal level, succession to the chieftaincy was a relatively straightforward matter. The tribal members were all agreed that their tribe had to have a chief. The only question was who. But at the supratribal level, the problem was more difficult. If it was the ruler of a confederation who had died, the tribes had to decide whether they wanted the confederation to continue and, if so, on what terms, and then also which of the eligible candidates for the khanship would make the best choice. If it was the ruler of a steppe empire who had died, it was up to one of the eligible candidates for the succession to establish his authority and forge the nomads once again into a united empire. In such a context, succession struggles were likely to be violent and protracted.
In a confederation, the tribal chiefs might meet and accept a suc- Nor was the succession struggle necessarily delayed until after the old khan had died. Foreseeing the upcoming choice, a khan's sons normally started to factionalize and jockey for position before their father's death, and the nature of the struggle might range from political maneuverings to parricide. A famous later example of this-although historians seem not to have recognized it as a function of the institution of tanistry that Turks, Mongols, andJurchens (or Manchus) shared-was the trouble that the K'ang-hsi emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty had with his sons.9 Not uncommonly, the father himself played an active part in his sons' upcoming tanistry struggle by transferring the command of military forces or weighting the odds in other ways in favor of the candidate of his choice. Carrying this principle to its logical conclusion, as Selim the Grim of the Ottoman empire did by killing off all his sons except the one whom he wanted to succeed, was probably very rare.
When a khan died, the concept of a regency might reinforce the integrity of a steppe empire fragmented by a struggle for succession, but more than one person was eligible to serve as regent: the deceased ruler's principal widow, also his youngest son by his principal wife (by "ultimogeniture" the inheritor-called odchigin, lord of the "fire," namely the tenthold-of his personal property), also the senior male (akha-literally "elder brother") of the ruling lineage. What is more, such regents were themselves usually committed to one or another of the parties of the succession struggle-if not, in the case of the odchigin or the akha, a candidate himself-so the empire's stability under such circumstances might be no more than a semblance.
To formalize their submission to a candidate for the succession and declare rival factions to be rebels, a candidate's supporters convened an assembly (khuriltaz)-also used to plan campaigns-at which they acclaimed him sovereign. Sometimes these assemblies were genuinely plenary and consisted of representatives of all the steppe nation's tribes. In such circumstances they may occasionally have been electoral. But the convening of a khuriltai without its outcome being a foregone conclusion was probably rare. Much more commonly they were merely acclamation ceremonies for a given candidate, acting in the steppe nation's name.
Legitimist historians, coming from sedentary civilizations in which the pattern of succession followed a more automatic course, write of "usurpations" and tend to date the reign of a given khan from the time of the khuriltai that acclaimed him. But this fails to take account of the lapse in supratribal government that occurred while the outcome of the steppe succession struggle was being decided. The overthrow of a sitting ruler by an eligible member of the ruling lineage was not "usurpation" in the steppe nomads' eyes. A reign's real beginning dated from the winning contestant's definitive triumph over the last of his serious rivals.
The succession period was a fateful time in the life of any steppe empire because of the potential that it held for dissolution. It might occasion a change in the tribal composition, gaining tribes or losing them or parts of them to other empires or confederations. Sometimes an empire or confederation might split-on relatively amicable terms-into a compound confederation, with, for example, eastern and western realms under two brothers, one of whom would be nominally subordinate to the other.
But in view of the recurrent disintegrations that succession struggles brought about, and in view of the weakness of the regency as an integrating institution, it is remarkable how well the continuity of tribal empires was preserved. Indeed, to some degree, succession struggles-participation in a common enterprise-reinforced the continuance of ecologically unnecessary supratribal polities. Only when all the members of a given tribe fought for a losing candidate was there any likelihood that the victor might break up a tribe or that a tribe might, in consequence of the succession, secede from the empire, but this must have been extremely rare. Usually each tribe was divided in its support of candidates for the khanship. Temporarily, the tribe would divide. One faction would support one candidate. Other factions would support others. When one of the candidates achieved victory, he might then reward the leader of the faction that had supported him by making him the tribal chief.
In the absence of any generally acknowledged supratribal ruler, participation in the electoral process constituted membership in the supratribal polity, no matter whether the election was held by tribal compact or by civil war. The recurrent, difficult, and often protracted and violent electoral process politicized tribal society down to the level of the haran, whose sentiments the tribal chiefs and nobles could not avoid taking into account. During this process, the integrity of the supratribal polity continued through the medium of the succession struggle itself. (The sources, it should be noted, do not present such struggles in this light. The majority of the sources-the Persian histories and the more voluminous but less exploited material in Chinese-are pro-Toluyid and might therefore be expected to emphasize tanistry and the legitimacy of struggles for succession, but they were written not by nomads but by sedentary historians and therefore reflect the legitimist conceptions with which these historians and agrarian societies generally were imbued.)
The succession dispute at the supratribal level was not just internal but sometimes became an extraimperial or an extraconfederal affair. Candidates for the khanship usually called upon temporary or long-standing relationships with tribes or other powers outside the polity and, if successful, ordinarily reciprocated in turn by according support -or refuge to their external allies.
Whereas succession within a tribal confederation was usually peaceful, succession to a steppe empire usually entailed civil war. In fact, a strong potential for succession war was always present even in the most harmonious confederations too, because every candidate for supratribal rule probably at least dreamed of making himself a steppe autocrat, breaking the autonomy of the tribes, and leading his united nation in glorious and lucrative war.
When steppe empires were built, they were built by men with such ambitions, and tribes submitted in hopes of sharing in the fruits of victory. So to rule an empire successfully-rather than merely reign over a confederation-a khan had to possess a keen eye for war and politics, the personality to command a following, and the ability to conquer his own people and subjugate them to his absolute rule. The best way to find a ruler with such qualities was to see who prevailed in a civil war of succession.
CONSOLIDATION OF A STEPPE EMPIRE
Before setting out upon the campaigns that would justify his existence, the would-be steppe autocrat had first to create his autocracy. Steppe autocracies were the fruit of civil wars. The phase of the nation's victories and plunder had to be preceded by a phase in which the violence was turned inward. Intertribal steppe war was not so destructive was warfare was in agrarian societies, but during a succession struggle, the tribes' collective energies were neutralized, and the nation was vulnerable to predation from outside.
A succession struggle was, by its very nature, one of the high points of tribal autonomy, but as a given candidate for the khanship began to win out, the pendulum would start to swing in the other direction. Uncommitted elements would go over to him. The more he won, the more factions would rally to his banners. Supporters of rival candidates, having been proclaimed rebels by his khuriltai, could now be legitimately despoiled and the booty distributed among his supporters. Booty and privileges thus began to be distributed to the members of the winning faction from the outset, but even factions on the losing side or sides would eventually be consoled once the consolidation phase was ended and the energies of the united nation began to be turned outward and there was outside plunder to be shared.
The an intermediary. In such a case, the role of the shaman would be that of priest. He would inform the khan (and everybody else) of Tenggeri's choice. As priest, the shaman was a powerful figure who might, at some later date, question the ruler's legitimacy and challenge his power. If the shaman were sufficiently docile, he would continue to be an asset to the khan, but if not, the khan would have to eliminate him and become both priest and emperor himself. The universal ruler had no need of any intermediary between him and the supreme god from whom his universal dominion derived.
But in the long run, neither victory in a war of succession, nor the incorporation of other steppe tribes and confederations, nor the establishment of a decimal military organization, nor Tenggeri's mandate for universal conquest and dominion could preserve the steppe autocrat's power and the integrity of his realm unless he used his power and his people to seize the wealth of the settled agrarian world. For the sake of mere extortion, a confederation with a nominal ruler would suffice. But if the tribes were to remain under the discipline of a steppe autocrat, he must raid and invade. The price of autocracy was that the autocrat could not stop. He must continue to enrich and engage his subjects by continuing war. Now to the questions with which we began.
WHAT SET THE MONGOLS IN MOTION?
What set any of the steppe nomads in motion? Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao has published an elegant article listing seven basic reasons that have been adduced to explain why the pastoral nomads repeatedly invaded China over the course of history."4 Briefly, they are: (1) the nomads' greedy and predatory nature; (2) climatic change (desiccation); (3) overpopulation of the steppe; (4) interruptions of trade on the part of the Chinese (pastoral surpluses could not be sold); (5) a need to supplement the low-level productivity of the fluctuating pastoral economy by plundering the surpluses of the more stable agrarian economy; (6) to build a supratribal polity; (7) nomad psychology-a desire to feel equal to the Chinese and a belief in the divine destiny of their own steppe kings to conquer the world.
All of these reasons (which are to a considerable degree interrelated) may have been variously applicable to the sudden eruption of the Mongols into East, Southeast, and Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East in the thirteenth century. But the reason that I regard as central and develop in this paper is the sixth.
The dynamics that I attribute to the Mongolian ecology and society of the twelfth century make the Mongols' sudden invasions seem nothing less than the natural thing. What else was to have been expected from a society with a warriorist culture whose entire population was perpetually on the move, whose economy was highly fragile, and whose wider society was not only highly fragile but dependent upon the extortion of agrarian wealth for its very existence? A society whose custom promoted succession to kingship by struggle, whose history had tended steadily toward absolutism and empire, and whose empires (in contradistinction to confederations Determined that one of her sons should succeed instead of Shiremuin, T6regene managed to delay matters for several years until, in 1246, she convened a khuriltai to acclaim Giiyuig, whom she favored over Koden, the latter not being in good health. Batu sent his brothers to attend the khuriltai, and they apparently took part in the acclamation, but he did not attend it himself. Giiyuig, realizing that the question of succession could not be settled until Batu was destroyed, set out against his cousin but died along the way in 1248, cutting short the succession struggle before its conclusion. Although the Yuan shih clearly reckons him an emperor, Juwayni and Rashid ad-Din withhold from Giiyuig the title of qa'dn and place after his name the lesser title of khan, as they do also with Jochi, Chaghadai, Tolui, and Hiilegui, none of whom was ever considered a khaghan by anyone.
Before the empire could disintegrate, Tolui's widow struck a bargain with Batu, who allowed her son Mongke to succeed. Batu's and Mongke's supporters convened their khuriltai in 1251, acclaimed Mongke, and won the advantage over the less organized supporters of Shiremiun and other possible contenders. By the end of 1252 or early in 1253, after the elimination of several princes of the houses of Ogodei and Chaghadai, the struggle was over.
The price of this bargain was Batu's autonomy. The ulus of Jochi began to drift away from the empire, becoming, in effect, a separate confederation. For a time, at least, thejochids continued to hold properties (called t'ou-hsia or t'ou-hsiang) in Toluyid China, and in one way or another some ofJochi's descendants continued to play a role in the succession struggles for the Toluyid throne, but increasingly it was the role of outsiders.
Thus, although not without difficulties, the empire cohered and continued to do the only thing that such an empire could do if it were to survive: push on and continue to conquer.
WHY DID THE MONGOLS WREAK SO MUCH DESTRUCTION?
At first glance, one might have expected the Turks and the Mongols to have followed a common pattern in the Middle East. Both peoples came from Mongolia. They spoke cognate languages, shared common elements of folklore, had practiced the same range of nomadic adaptations, and had both first viewed the sedentary world from the perspective of the nomad face to face with China.
In fact, the difference between the behavior of the Turks in the Middle East and that of the Mongols could hardly have been greater. The Turks came in gradually, in groups of limited size, over a substantial period of time, and entered into the Muslim culture and politics of the region as full-fledged members. In the process they did comparatively little damage.
Not so the Mongols. They came as an avalanche, a cyclone, massacred large numbers of people, and did such destruction that the effect of their mayhem is arguably still perceptible. Much of the explanation for this contrast lies in the different conditions under which these two peoples made their entry.
The Turks had started westward mainly as refugees who had lost out to stronger nomads in struggles to control the East Asian steppes. They came in individual groups, and, before reaching the Middle East, they first tarried in Central Asia, where they encountered the desert pastoral habitat mentioned at the begining of this essay.
The deserts are arid and contain little vegetation; pasture is to be found mainly along the edges, where there is water, and in these more hospitable areas are to be found not just water but farms, villages, and towns.
In the desert habitat, nomads and settled peoples had frequent and repeated contacts. The desert constricted all agriculture, both pastoral and agrarian, so that wherever pasture was to be found, it was likely to be interspersed with towns and cultivated fields. The nomad, whose pastoralism would, under such conditions, require him seasonally to return to the same places, wanted peace with his sedentary counterpart so as to be annually welcomed back and so that exchanges, which occurred mainly in markets and eye-to-eye between the individual nomad and the merchant or farmer, could continue with a minimum of difficulty. Living as part of a relatively tight nomadic-sedentary continuum, which, using his military strength, he of course tried to control, the desert nomad understood agrarian cultivation and urban society. In response to his habitat, he developed a distinct pattern of interaction with his sedentary neighbors, one that stressed control.
Long Undoubtedly each of these arguments contains parts of the explanation, and the heat of India was certainly a factor, but arguments based on the strength of the potential victims or insufficiency of pasture or a hot climate do not make very satisfactory answers to the question of why the Mongols withdrew from such promnising fields for plunder precisely when they did, namely in 1242 and 1260.
In view of the strength of the powers that the Mongols did subdue, the remaining defenders in India, Europe, and the Middle East do not seem too daunting-although, as Saunders points out, Hiilegiiid rivalry with the Jochids (intensified by Mongke's death) could to some degree have had a neutralizing effect on the Mongols' military potential in the Levant. The Europeans were so divided against themselves that Plano Carpini's primary reason for not wanting to bring an ambassador from Giiyuig back to Europe was fear "lest seeing the dissensions and wars which are rife among us, they might be all the more encouraged to attack us. A corollary question, which I shall not pursue here, is why the Mongols, having stopped to deal with the problems of succession, did not resume their conquests and continue to expand. For this, geopolitical factors, the dynamics of steppe imperial politics, the small size of the "Mongghol" population, the heat of India and Southeast Asia, and other reasons, including those given by Qureshi, Ikram, Sinor, and Saunders, will help to provide an answer.
WHY DID THE MONGOLS EMPIRE DISINTEGRATE SO QUICKLY
It should be apparent from all that has preceded that, as compared with what was to have been expected from a steppe autocracy, the Mongols' empire, which lasted through at least three generations, did not disintegrate quickly. The question should themselves in Mongolia and supported Arigh B6ke for the succession over Khubilai, darling of the "cohabiters." When Khubilai prevailed, the nomadizers found a champion in Khaidu, the last serious contender of the Ogodeyid line, and thus merged the contest for empire-wide succession with an empire-wide struggle between cohabiters and nomadizers.
In the Hiilegiiid realm the issue was more muted. Adoption of Islam and the desert pattern that the Turks had already established eased almost all the Mongols into the position of cohabiters. But in Chaghatay the issue was as acute as it was in China, possibly more acute, because Chaghatay, like China, adjoined the steppes but, unlike China, was dominated by Turkish Muslim culture. To cohabit was to become a Turk and a Muslim. To nomadize meant staying in or returning to the steppe and remaining a Mongol and a believer in the universal sky-god Tenggeri-at least until the late fourteenth century, when the assimilative power of Turco-Muslim culture became too strong to resist. From the 1260s Chaghatay politics revolved around this question-to cohabit or nomadize? As in Mongolia, the nomadizers rallied to the support of Khaidu, and the issue remained alive until, toward the middle of the fourteenth century, the Chaghatay "nation" itself split permanently in two: a cohabiters' realm based in Mawarannahr (the Ulus Chaghatay) and a nation of nomadizers in Moghulistan.
Had the khaghan and the bulk of the Mongolian population remained "nomadizers" in the steppe and followed their traditional steppe pattern to exploit the agrarian world, their empire might have had a longer lease on life. But the bulk of the Mongols moved into the agrarian world, where, as "cohabiters, " they pursued the "desert" pattern and were transformed into several peoples, several separate realms. Speaking different languages, putting their trust in different religions, and pursuing different aims in different habitats, they could no longer form a single polity. The steppe, which had been their center, became a periphery. The defeat of Arigh Boke and Khaidu and the triumph of Khubilai foreshadowed the empire's doom. 
